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Abstract 
 
Over the years, the literature on individual data anonymization has burgeoned in many 
directions. Borrowing from several areas of other sciences, the current diversity of concepts, 
models and tools available contributes to understanding and fostering individual data 
dissemination in a privacy-preserving way, as well as unleashing new sources of information 
for the benefits of society at large. However, such diversity doesn’t come without some 
difficulties. Currently, the task of selecting the optimal analytical environment to conduct 
anonymization is complicated by the multitude of available choices. Based on recent 
contributions from the literature and inspired by cryptography, this paper proposes the first 
cipher for data anonymization. The functioning of this cipher shows that, in fact, every 
anonymization method can be viewed as a general form of rank swapping with unconstrained 
permutation structures. Beyond all the currently existing methods that it can mimic, this 
cipher offers a new way to practice data anonymization, notably by performing 
anonymization in an ex-ante way, instead of being engaged in several ex-post evaluations and 
iterations to reach the protection and information properties sought after. Moreover, the 
properties of this cipher point to some previously unknown general insights into the task of 
data anonymization considered at a general level of functioning. Finally, and to make the 
cipher operational, this paper proposes the introduction of permutation menus in data 
anonymization, where recently developed universal measures of disclosure risk and 
information loss are used ex-ante for the calibration of permutation keys. To justify the 
relevance of their uses, a theoretical characterization of these measures is also proposed. 
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1. Introduction and contributions of this paper 
Data on individual subjects are increasingly gathered and exchanged. By their nature, they 
provide a rich amount of information that can inform statistical and policy analysis in a meaningful 
way. However, due to the legal obligations surrounding these data, this wealth of information is often 
not fully exploited in order to protect the confidentiality of respondents and to avoid privacy threats. 
In fact, such requirements shape the dissemination policy of individual data at national and 
international levels. The issue is how to ensure a sufficient level of data protection to meet releasers’ 
concerns in terms of legal and ethical requirements, while still offering users a reasonable level of 
information. Over the last decade the role of micro data has changed from being the preserve of 
National Statistical Offices and government departments to being a vital tool for a wide range of 
analysts trying to understand both social and economic phenomena. This has raised a new range of 
questions and pressing needs about the privacy/information trade-off and the quest for best practices 
that can be both useful to users but also respectful of respondents’ privacy. 
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) research has a rich history of addressing those issues by 
providing the analytical apparatus through which the privacy/information trade-off can be assessed 
and implemented. SDC consists in the set of tools that can enhance the level of confidentiality of any 
data while preserving to a lesser or greater extent its level of information (see [1] for an authoritative 
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survey). Over the years, it has burgeoned in many directions. In particular, techniques applicable to 
micro data, which are the focus of this paper, offer a wide variety of tools to protect the 
confidentiality of respondents while maximizing the information content of the data released, for the 
benefits of society at large. Such diversity is undoubtedly useful but has, however, one major 
drawback: a lack of agreement and clarity on the appropriate choice of tools in a given context, and as 
a consequence, a lack of a comprehensive view (or at best an incomplete one) across the relative 
performances of the techniques available. The practical scope of current micro data masking methods 
is not fully exploited precisely because there is no overarching framework. All methods generally 
carry their own analytical environment, underlying approach and definitions of privacy and 
information.  
 A step toward the resolution of this limitation has been recently proposed ([2], [3]), by 
establishing that any micro data masking method can be viewed as functionally equivalent to a 
permutation of the original data, plus eventually a small noise addition. This insight, called the 
permutation paradigm, unambiguously establishes a common ground upon which any anonymization 
method can be used. However, this paradigm was not originally considered by its author as a new 
anonymization method per se, but instead as a way to evaluate any method applied to any data set on 
common grounds. This statement can be reconsidered. As will be discussed in this paper, the fact that 
it provides a post-anonymization common ground for evaluation makes it also suitable for an ex-ante 
approach to data anonymization, where in fact anonymization is performed directly from permutation. 
This is the objective of this paper, which develops a new approach to data anonymization by 
proposing a general cipher based on permutation keys, and which appears to be equivalent to a 
general form of rank swapping ([4], [5]). Beyond the existing methods that this cipher can universally 
reproduce, it also offers a new way to practice data anonymization based on the exploration of 
different permutation structures. This cipher can be used to perform anonymization in an ex-ante way 
instead of being engaged in several ex-post evaluations and iterations to reach the protection and 
information properties sought after. The subsequent study of the cipher’s properties additionally 
reveals some new insights into what is the task of anonymization taken at a general level of 
functioning. Finally, to make this cipher operational, this paper proposes the introduction of 
permutation menus in data anonymization, where recently proposed universal measures of disclosure 
risk and information loss are used ex-ante for the calibration of permutation keys. To justify the 
relevance of their use, a theoretical characterization of these measures is also proposed. 
The contributions of this paper are thus several. Following a discussion of some background 
concepts in Section 2, we define in Section 3 a general cipher for data anonymization, which puts the 
permutation paradigm on formal grounds. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first time a 
cipher is proposed in the context of individual data anonymization. Because it is able to replicate the 
outcomes of any anonymization methods, the subsequent study of its properties reveals some 
previously unknown general principles driving data anonymization. In particular, a pivotal one will 
turn out to be that the task of anonymization can be performed independently of the data to be 
anonymized. We thus argue in Section 4 that this principle paves a new approach to data 
anonymization. Instead of going through a succession of trial and errors to reach the desired levels of 
utility and risk before releasing a data set, which is the way most of the current methods are put into 
practice ([6]), data anonymization can in fact be performed through an ex-ante approach. The use of 
suitable metrics, that will be characterized theoretically, allows calibrating the keys of the cipher and 
then anonymizing the data with some pre-defined levels of risk and utility that will be automatically 
translated onto the anonymized data. The ex-post checking of the properties of the anonymized data 
set thus becomes irrelevant, which delivers a more efficient approach for conducting anonymization. 
These results open several new lines of research gathered in Section 5. 
 
2. Background and related work 
In this section, we summarize the general approach to individual data transaction and the 
basics of SDC methods, as well as their commonalities and differences with cryptography. We then 
turn to the description of the recent functional equivalence in anonymization for ex-post evaluation 
established by the permutation paradigm, upon which this paper is based. 
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2.1 Individual data transaction and protection 
A general and standard way of describing a transaction on individual data is to consider two agents: a 
data releaser, which supplies individual data, e.g. public administrations, enterprises, and some data 
users, who demand individual data, e.g. researchers, public administrations, enterprises. The former 
typically gathers, under some suitable forms, a micro data set that is data collected from individuals. 
The latter will have various needs in terms of information and seeks the data in order to conduct a 
potentially large variety of tasks. Note that in this simple setting we assume trustworthiness on the 
supplier side, meaning that the data releaser knows the identities of the respondents who contributed 
to the data set out of their good will. Moreover, we do not restrict the set of potential tasks to be 
conducted by the data users, which thus can range from simple data mining tasks such as frequencies 
counts and computation of the mean and median of a distribution, to more elaborate tasks such as 
econometric techniques. Alternatively, this is equivalent to considering that the data releaser is not 
equipped with sufficient technical knowledge to conduct the different tasks that the users have in 
mind. Thus, data are released without being tailored to very specific needs. 
 The delivery of the micro data set by the data releaser to the data users, via any potential 
channel, is what characterizes a transaction on individual data. The users then go away with the data 
to perform some tasks on them without any further interaction with the releaser. As such, and as 
previously defined in the literature, the transaction is a standard non-interactive one ([7]). Naturally, 
other types of transactions are possible: for example, and by assuming that the data releaser has 
sufficient technical knowledge, data mining tasks could be performed on the data by the releaser upon 
request of the users, and the former will communicate the outputs of the tasks to the latter. For such an 
interactive transaction, differential privacy has gained strong momentum in the literature to 
conceptualize and tackle the issues that could arise in terms of privacy protection. However, some 
questions remain unresolved, such as the quality of the output that is delivered to the users in terms of 
information ([8]). Moreover, and because in an interactive transaction a mechanism is sitting between 
the releaser and the users in order to perform the tasks, it is ultimately outputs that are delivered to the 
users, not data per se. As a result, one has to make some untenable assumptions about the users’ 
needs, by inevitably restraining them or similarly assuming a very expert data releaser that could 
perform any kind of task. As noted, this is not what we will assume in this paper because such 
assumptions could only lead to unrealistic, or at most, specific forms of data transactions
2
. Given 
these limitations, the scope of this paper is thus voluntarily narrowed to the non-interactive exchange 
of data sets. 
 Non-interactive data transactions immediately raise the pressing question of privacy, even 
more so than in other forms of exchange. In modern societies with pervasive data collection, it is a 
matter of general interest to grant access to individual data, but not to the detriment of privacy, a 
fundamental right for all individuals. The exchange of individual data in their original form, as 
collected by the releaser, generally entails a violation of individual privacy given the sensitive 
information that they can contain. This is why the privacy legislations that prevail in most countries 
preclude the dissemination of data that are linkable to individuals or allow the recovery of some of 
their characteristics. So, in order to prevent any disclosure on individuals, data have first to be 
anonymized through the application of suitable statistical disclosure control (SDC) techniques.  
 SDC research has a long and rich history in providing data releasers with a set of tools for 
anonymizing individual data under various settings ([1]). In a nutshell, for non-interactive data 
exchange, the overall approach of SDC is for a data releaser to modify the original data set in some 
way that reduces disclosure risk while altering as little as possible the information that it contains. As 
a result, at a general level SDC techniques can be classified into two main approaches: 
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 Privacy-first: the method is applied with the primary goal of complying with some pre-
requisites on the level of privacy, judged as acceptable and under which data exchange can 
take place. 
 Utility-first: the method is applied with the primary goal of complying with some pre-
requisites on the level of information judged as valuable enough to make data exchange 
worthwhile. 
The privacy-first approach shares certain features with cryptography. Indeed, the act of protecting 
privacy through anonymization can be conceived as a form of encryption, where it is the individuals’ 
identities that are encrypted. However, the utility-first approach establishes a first fundamental 
difference with cryptography, as it would be pointless to release micro data that contain no 
information at all. So, while the very goal of cryptography is to release a cypher text that discloses 
nothing whatsoever about the underlying plaintext, the purpose of individual data exchange is to 
release data (i.e. the cypher text) considered as safe as possible in term of privacy, while purposefully 
leaking some information (and generally, the more the better). A second fundamental difference lies 
in the types of agents involved and how the transaction operates. 
In cryptography, a sender encrypts a message and the receiver decrypts it with the appropriate 
key, while in the middle an attacker tries to intercept the message and to decipher it using 
cryptanalysis techniques. In an individual data exchange, first, there is ideally no decryption phase: 
the data user takes the released data set as given for his analysis needs. Second, while in cryptography 
there is a clear distinction between sender, receiver and attacker, in an individual data exchange the 
receiver can also be an attacker. Indeed, a malevolent user could potentially try to re-identify 
individuals in a data set and the data releaser has no way of preventing this after the exchange takes 
place (nor would an ex-ante screening of the users to identify the reliable ones preclude, in principle, 
that they become attackers). Finally, a third difference is that the re-identification of individuals, 
which constitutes an attack in data anonymization, carries a different meaning than an attack in 
cryptography. Indeed, while in the latter case the single objective is generally to retrieve the full 
plaintext, in the former this not so: the re-identification of at least one individual can already be 
considered as a successful attack. Thus, the cryptographic viewpoint of an attack in data 
anonymization is about identifying some individuals but not necessarily all of them, i.e. some of the 
plaintext but not necessarily all of it. To summarize, while in principle micro data are not meant to be 
deciphered, the releaser must sufficiently encipher the data so as to prevent any re-identification of 
individuals, while at the same time ensuring that the data contain a sufficient level of information to 
be meaningful to most users. Here lies the fundamental trade-off in individual data exchange that is 
not present in cryptography: encryption, i.e. privacy preservation, versus information leakage. The 
goal of SDC techniques is to manage this trade-off in a meaningful and practical way. 
 To do so, research in SDC has led to a wide variety of tools, spanning several possible types 
of data across different fields. This diversity of available techniques is undoubtedly an asset but it 
comes also with some drawbacks ([9]). The lack of an overarching framework upon which the trade-
off between utility and disclosure risk can be assessed is problematic because it leads to an absence of 
consensus regarding “best practices”. In fact, the current state of the literature, while of high quality, 
offers at best techniques tied to the context upon which they operate.  For example, comparing the 
level of utility and privacy achieved by different methods on different data sets is an awkward task as 
different metrics and/or different parametrizations are largely heterogeneous, so that no common 
ground exists for comparison. This is why generally only ad-hoc comparisons can be conducted ([3]). 
Additionally, each metric embodies distributional dependence and this feature has a significant impact 
for the performance evaluation of masking methods across data sets ([9]). 
 Another issue stems from the fact that agents involved in a data exchange all have different 
views regarding privacy and utility. Typically, different releasers will have different views on what is 
an acceptable level of privacy, and users will overall tend to put greater weight on data utility and be 
less concerned about privacy than most releasers. Moreover, inside the population of users, 
information needs can greatly differ according to what they plan to do with the data. Currently, SDC 
techniques don’t offer sufficient flexibility to account for such heterogeneity in preferences. The 
above distinction between utility and privacy-first approaches is undoubtedly a way toward the 
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representation of different sensitivities, but it nonetheless remains at a high level of principle and is 
also barely met in practice. In fact, in a utility (resp. privacy)-first approach, it is advisable to check 
the value of privacy (resp. utility) achieved by the methods before data dissemination, which thus 
always lead to the limitation of context-dependence exposed above. Moreover, inside each approach, 
none of the methods available can straightforwardly cope with different preferences in terms of 
privacy and information. 
 To address these issues and the need to generalize the concepts used in SDC, a recent 
contribution in the literature proposed a general functional equivalence based on permutations to 
describe any data masking method (see [3] and its subsequent development in [2]). 
  
2.2 The permutation paradigm in data anonymization 
  The permutation paradigm in data anonymization starts from the observation that any 
anonymized data set can be viewed as a permutation of the original data plus a non-rank perturbative 
noise addition. Thus, it establishes that all masking methods can be thought of in terms of a single 
ingredient, i.e. permutation. This result clearly has far reaching conceptual and practical 
consequences, in the sense that it provides a single and easily understandable reading key, 
independent of the model parameters, the risk measures or the specific characteristics of the data, to 
interpret the utility/protection outcome of an anonymization procedure. 
To illustrate this equivalence, we introduce a toy example which consists (without loss of 
generality) of five records and three attributes X=(X1, X2, X3) generated by sampling N(10,10
2
), 
N(100,40
2
) and N(1000,2000
2
) distributions, respectively. Noise is then added to obtain Y=(Y1, Y2, 
Y3), the three anonymized version of the attributes, from N(0,5
2
), N(0,20
2
) and N(0,1000
2
) 
distributions, respectively. One can see that the masking procedure generates a permutation of the 
records of the original data (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 Now, as long as the attributes’ values of a data set can be ranked, which is obvious in the case 
of numerical and categorical ordinal attributes, but also feasible in the case of nominal ones ([10]), it 
is always possible to derive a data set Z that contains the attributes X1, X2 and X3, but ordered 
according to the ranks of Y1, Y2 and Y3, respectively, i.e. in Table 1 re-ordering (X1, X2, X3) 
according to (Y1R, Y2R, Y3R). This can be done following the post-masking reverse procedure outlined 
in ([3]). Finally, the masked data Y can be fully reconstituted by adding small noises (E1, E2, E3) 
(small in the sense that they cannot re-rank Z while they can still be large in absolute values) to each 
observation in each attribute (Table 2). 
 
X1 X2 X3 Y1 Y2 Y3
13 135 3707 8 160 3248
20 52 826 20 57 822
2 123 -1317 -1 122 248
15 165 2419 18 135 597
29 160 -1008 29 164 -1927
X1R X2R X3R Y1R Y2R Y3R
4 3 1 4 2 1
2 5 3 2 5 2
5 4 5 5 4 4
3 1 2 3 3 3
1 2 4 1 1 5
Table 1. An illustration of the permutation paradigm
Original dataset X Masked dataset Y
Rank of the original attribute Rank of the masked attribute
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By construction, Z has the same marginal distributions as X, which is an appealing property. 
Moreover, under a maximum-knowledge intruder model of disclosure risk evaluation, the small noise 
addition turns out to be irrelevant ([2] and Section 3): re-identification via record linkage can only 
come from permutation, as by construction noise addition cannot alter ranks. Reverse mapping thus 
establishes permutation as the overarching principle of data anonymization, allowing the functioning 
of any method to be viewed as the outcome of a permutation of the original data, independently of 
how the method operates. This result has been explicitly proposed by its authors for the ex-post 
evaluation of anonymization, but not as a new technique for conducing anonymization. As we will 
see, it can in fact be viewed and operationalized as a new, general framework for anonymization. 
One may be surprised by this result and ask why all in all, the fundamental principle of data 
anonymization appears to be as simple as permutation. After all, in cryptography, permutation 
cyphers and their cryptanalyses have been known for centuries. They are easy to detect because they 
don’t affect individual symbols’ frequencies (the equivalent of this in the permutation paradigm being 
the preservation of marginal distributions). In fact, and as will be discussed in what follows, it turns 
out that the obvious weakness of permutation cypher in standard cryptography shows up as strength in 
data anonymization, in the sense that the degree of permutation performed allows to control for the 
amount of information that is leaked. Moreover, because the permutation paradigm proposes one 
single universal language for data anonymization, it allows introducing some measures of disclosure 
risk and information loss that can be used in any context, and flexible enough to capture the variety of 
views that can occur in a data exchange ([11] and Section 4 below). While these measures were also 
originally proposed for the ex-post evaluation of the outcomes of any anonymization techniques on 
any data, they can in fact be used equally validly ex-ante to conduct anonymization. 
 
3. Definition and properties of a cipher for data anonymization 
 
3.1 Data anonymization as a cipher 
We first recall a proposition that has been made in a recent contribution and that naturally 
results from the permutation paradigm ([11]): 
  
 
 
X1 X2 X3 Z1 Z2 Z3
13 135 3707 13 160 3707
20 52 826 20 52 2419
2 123 -1317 2 123 -1008
15 165 2419 15 135 826
29 160 -1008 29 165 -1317
E1 E2 E3 Y1 Y2 Y3
-5 0 -459 8 160 3248
0 5 -1597 20 57 822
-3 0 1256 -1 122 248
2 0 -229 18 135 597
0 -1 -610 29 164 -1927
Table 2. Equivalence in anonymisation: postmasking reverse mapping 
plus noise addition
Original dataset X Reverse mapped dataset Z
Noise E Masked dataset Y(=Z+E)
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Proposition 1: For a data set
3
 X(n,p) with n records and p attributes (X1,..,Xp), its anonymized version 
Y(n,p) can always be written, regardless of the anonymization methods used, as: 
𝑌(𝑛,𝑝) = (𝑃1𝑋1, … , 𝑃𝑝𝑋𝑝)(𝑛,𝑝) + 𝐸(𝑛,𝑝) 
where P1,..,Pp is a set of p permutation matrices and E(n,p) is a matrix of small noises. 
 
Proposition 1 highlights the fact that because permutation appears to be the overarching 
principle ruling data anonymization, the functioning of any method can be expressed as a set of 
permutation matrices, plus eventually a matrix of small noises. Despite the large heterogeneity in the 
methods currently available, e.g. rank-based, noise-based, cluster-based, they can in fact essentially 
all be viewed as the application of permutation matrices to the original data set. This proposition 
forms the basis upon which a cipher for data anonymization can be built. However, it remains limited 
in the sense that the permutation keys are not isolated. Indeed, except in the particular case where all 
the pairwise correlation across the p attributes are equal to one, the set of P1,..,Pp matrices will not 
measure the amount of permutation. To do so, each attribute needs first to be sorted in increasing 
order, which can be viewed as preliminary permutations, then the levels of permutations aimed at 
anonymizing the data set are introduced, and finally the sorting is undone through the inverse 
permutation matrix of the first step. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: For a data set X(n,p) with n records and p attributes (X1,..,Xp), its anonymized version 
Y(n,p) can always be written, regardless of the anonymization methods used, as: 
𝑌(𝑛,𝑝) = (𝐴1
𝑇𝐷1𝐴1𝑋1, … , 𝐴𝑝
𝑇𝐷𝑝𝐴𝑝𝑋𝑝)(𝑛,𝑝) + 𝐸(𝑛,𝑝) 
where A1,..,Ap is a set of p permutation matrices that sort the attributes in increasing order, 𝐴1
𝑇,.., 𝐴𝑝
𝑇  
a set of p permutation matrices that put back the attribute in the original order, D1,..,Dp is a set of 
permutation matrices for anonymizing the data and E(n,p) is a matrix of small noises. 
 
Proposition 2 describes the fundamental functioning of any anonymization method with the 
permutation keys made explicit. Proceeding attribute by attribute, each is first permuted to appear in 
increasing order, then the key is injected, and finally it is re-ordered back to its original form by 
applying the inverse of the first step (which in the case of a permutation matrix is simply its 
transpose). A small noise is also eventually added. Clearly, we have that 𝑃𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗
𝑇𝐷𝑗𝐴𝑗 ∀𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝 
with D1,..,Dp subsuming the properties of any anonymization method by capturing the amount of 
permutation performed. For example, considering the following permutation matrix 𝐷𝑗 applied to a 
given attribute j: 
(
 
 
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0)
 
 
 
 and counting line by line how this matrix departs from the identity matrix: 
(
 
 
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1)
 
 
 
i.e. how the 1’s have been shifted by assigning a negative (resp. positive) sign for a right shifting 
(resp. left shifting), one can conclude that the first record has been moved 4 ranks down, the fourth 3 
ranks up and the fifth 1 rank up, while the second and third records have been left in their original 
positions. These simple computations are a way of describing the functioning of any anonymization 
method, but in the language of permutation. 
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Proposition 2 thus considers data anonymization at a general level of operation and, 
following the permutation paradigm, contains all currently existing methods. Interestingly, its nature 
is similar to the functioning of rank swapping, where data are first sorted in increasing order, 
permuted within a limited range and then re-ranked according to their original values ([1], [5]). For 
example, consider the following permutation matrix for one attribute and 6 records: 
(
  
 
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0)
  
 
 
This matrix, when applied using Proposition 2, is a permutation key for rank swapping with a 
swapping distance equal to one. Thus, data swapping has a functioning that can in fact describe any 
anonymization method, while it is the swapping distance selected that constrains the structure of the 
permutation keys. Other methods, such as noise- or cluster-based, will lead to different permutation 
structure, but ultimately they all boil down to a form of general rank swapping. However, working 
directly with permutation keys allows uncovering some permutation patterns that may not be mirrored 
by currently known techniques, which can potentially extend the set of anonymization tools available. 
This feature will be discussed in more depth in Section 4. 
 Now that a general key structure has been made explicit, we can define a cipher for data 
anonymization: 
 
Proposition 3: The three-tuple Γ = (Ρ, Κ, Ε) with the following conditions satisfied: 
 𝛲 is a finite set of possible original and anonymized data sets of 𝑛 ≥ 2 records and 𝑝 ≥ 1 
attributes 
 𝛫 is the keyspace, a finite set of possible key groups k, each containing p permutation-based 
keys  
 For each key groups 𝑘 ∈ 𝛫 there exists a group of p permutation-based encryption rules 
𝜀𝑘 ∈ Ε, where each group 𝜀𝑘: 𝛲 → 𝛲 is a function such that 𝜀𝑘(𝑥) = 𝑦 for ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝛲 
is a cipher for data anonymization. 
 
This proposition derives from Proposition 2 and establishes the whole task of data 
anonymization as a cipher composed of three entities. The first one is the set of possible data sets 𝛲 
(i.e. the set of plaintexts in cryptography) of n records and p attributes, e.g. (X1,..,Xp), which also 
defines the set of possible anonymized data sets (i.e. the set of cyphertexts). The cipher is thus 
endomorphic ([12]). It is indeed valid to define a cipher for data anonymization in the particular 
endomorphic case because, as outlined above, the essential principle of data anonymization is 
permutation. One can also add some small noises, which are in principle required to recompose 
exactly the outcome of some methods (for example noise-based ones). But the small noises won’t 
change any ranks and thus won’t provide any additional protection against disclosure risk. Instead, 
they will alter the data in a small but unnecessary way that could be detrimental to information. For 
example, adding small noises won’t exactly preserve the marginal distributions of a data set, though 
such preservation remains a desirable feature of any anonymization tools. Stated otherwise, in data 
anonymization, it is desirable and somewhat intuitive to expect that any information loss must have as 
a counterpart improved protection. This is not the case for these non-rank perturbative small noises, as 
only permutations matter. Consequently, as they don’t provide any additional protection but lead 
instead to superfluous information loss, small noises can be disregarded from the definition of the 
cipher. Thus, as for permutation ciphers in cryptography, the sets of plaintexts and cyphertexts are the 
same (while adding small noises would have made the two sets generally different). 
The second entity of the cipher is the keyspace 𝛫. Here, it is important to note that a key is 
not defined as a single element, which is generally the case in cryptography, but following 
Proposition 2, as a group of p keys, i.e. (D1,..,Dp), with p being the number of attributes in the data set 
to be anonymized. Otherwise put, each attribute is equipped with its own key, i.e. a permutation 
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matrix, but this is the group of these p keys that forms the key used for anonymizing the whole data 
set. As will be made clear in Section 4, the relative properties of the elements within the key group 
can be used to assess information loss, a feature that differentiates data anonymization from standard 
cryptography.  
Finally, the third element is the set of encryption rules, whereas for the keys an encryption 
rule is a collection of p specific rules for each attributes. From Proposition 2, those rules are given by 
e.g. (𝐴1
𝑇𝐷1𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑝
𝑇𝐷𝑝𝐴𝑝), and thus are all based on the products of permutation matrices. However, 
one crucial departure from standard cryptography is that no decryption rules are postulated and nor 
are they necessary. As noted in Section 2, individual data exchange doesn’t require decryption per se. 
Once data have been anonymized with the desired levels of disclosure risk and information loss, they 
are meant to be released and used anonymized. The fact that decryption is not necessary considerably 
reduces the potential practical difficulties in implementing the cipher. For example, the problem of 
key exchange as in symmetric-key cryptography doesn’t exist here. Moreover, in principle, one 
doesn’t need to select only injective encryption functions to accomplish decryption in an 
unambiguous manner, albeit in practice it can be noted that because data anonymization relies on 
permutation the encryption functions will necessarily be injective ([12]). In any case, in the context of 
data anonymization, this concept appears to be irrelevant. 
 
3.2  Some general principles in data anonymization 
Having defined a cipher that streamlines the permutation paradigm in data anonymization and 
that can universally mimic any masking method, we can now characterize some of its properties that 
will de facto pervade to the task of data anonymization in general. We start by a first property that 
establishes data independence in anonymization: 
 
Property 1: Because it can be defined as a cipher, individual data anonymization can always be 
performed independently of the data to be anonymized. In particular, the distinction between a utility 
and privacy-first approach is fundamentally unnecessary. 
 
The first property is a simple but nonetheless pivotal consequence that stems from the 
possibility of formulating the task of data anonymization as a cipher. It means that the keys, and thus 
protection, can be handled and calibrated independently of the data. This may go against the intuition 
of some statistical disclosure control practitioner, as most of the current existing techniques and their 
performances are linked to the data upon which they are applied. For example, for multiplicative noise 
injection with a given parametrization, changes in the distributional characteristics of the data may 
have a large impact on the level of protection ([13]). More generally, the parameter values of a given 
method may be a poor indicator of the protection level achieved, as it is the conjunction of these 
parameters and the distributional characteristics of the data that will ultimately deliver the protection 
level. As mentioned in the preceding section, this explains why a sequence of trial and error is 
generally necessary in data masking. Even in a privacy-first approach, ex-post disclosure risk analysis 
is advised to check if a sufficient level of protection has been effectively achieved. The permutation 
paradigm, and in this paper its formulation as a cipher, solves this issue, as the permutation keys can 
be calibrated ex-ante with a given level of protection and thus of information that the encryption will 
automatically apply to, but independently of, the data. In particular, it turns out that both privacy and 
utility can be targeted simultaneously and one doesn’t have to choose an approach ex-ante and check 
the other one (or even the two) ex-post. 
Originally, the permutation paradigm was proposed to put the comparisons of different 
methods (and their different parametrizations) across different data sets on a common ground ([3]). 
Thus, its main goal was the simplification of post-anonymization comparisons. But in fact nothing 
precludes, conceptually and practically, thinking about data anonymization only in terms of 
permutations. In return, that means that permutation levels, and thus permutation keys, can be 
calibrated ex-ante to carry out anonymization instead of being retrieved ex-post to assess the effect of 
an anonymization method. Thus, whatever the large heterogeneities in the analytical apparatus of 
masking methods available, they all appear to have an underlying, common permutation-based 
structure that is independent of the data upon which they are applied. 
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Property 2: Information loss in data anonymization can only come from the alteration of the 
dependency among attributes, as the cipher Γ requires a permutation key per attribute. 
 
 This property narrows the notion of information loss in data anonymization. As mentioned 
above, given the fact that the overarching principle of data anonymization is permutation, marginal 
distributions are necessarily always preserved as small noise additions in the reverse mapping 
procedure are unnecessary. Although they can still be considered, small noise additions are not a 
fundamental step for recreating the protection outcomes delivered by a method. As a result, the 
preservation of marginal distributions (non-disclosive in nature), a feature that could appear at first 
glance as a stringent requirement, is in fact implicitly fulfilled by any anonymization method. This 
property may also address some recurrent users’ concerns about the way data have been modified 
during the anonymization process, where the addition of noise is sometimes viewed as non-acceptable 
by some users ([9]). But in fact, any method can ultimately preserve marginal distributions and thus 
can be analyzed on the anonymized data set in the same way as on the original data. In the cipher Γ 
this fact is made clear by each attribute being equipped with its own permutation key, leaving the 
attributes’ distribution, taken in isolation, unchanged. Information loss can thus only occur from a 
change in the dependency among attributes, i.e. how attributes will be permuted relative to each other. 
 
Property 3: The compounding of two or more anonymization methods is always an inefficient 
procedure as the cipher Γ is idempotent. 
 
Relying on permutation Γ is idempotent, i.e. Γ × Γ = Γ. To see this, assume two unspecified 
anonymization methods applied sequentially on a given data set. Clearly, each of them has an 
underlying permutation structure, i.e. they can be expressed respectively as Γ1 = (Ρ, Κ1, Ε1) and 
Γ2 = (Ρ, Κ2, Ε2). The product cipher of  Γ1 and Γ2, denoted Γ1 × Γ2, is defined to be the cipher 
(Ρ, Κ1 × Κ2, E) ([14]). But, the product of two permutation matrices is always a permutation matrix 
([15]). Therefore, there is no point in encrypting the data set first with the key Κ1 and then with Κ2, as 
it could have been done directly using a permutation key equal to the product of  Κ1 and Κ2. In terms 
of anonymization, that means that compounding two methods necessitates two steps but can’t provide 
more protection than directly using a single step. Instead of targeting a protection level that is known 
to be reachable by the successive application of two methods (say for example additive noise addition 
then micro-aggregation), one can calibrate a group of permutation keys to reach this level directly. 
Consequently, the successive application of different methods is inefficient and anonymization can 
never reach different outcomes beyond the ones authorized within the set of all permutation keys. 
 
Property 4: The cipher Γ is pure. Thereby, an adversary attacking an anonymized data set will always 
face the same kind of cryptanalytic problem, whatever the method used for anonymization. 
 
Attacks on a data set to re-identify individuals are generally and realistically conceptualized 
through record linkage, which can be used in the context of any anonymization method and disclosure 
scenario ([16]). Many different record linkage attacks have been suggested in the literature (see for 
example ([17]) for an in-depth comparison between distance-based and probability-based procedures), 
but Property 4 reduces the type of attacks that can take place on individual data to the same 
cryptanalytic problem. Because the cipher Γ is both endomorphic and idempotent, it is pure. But in a 
pure cipher, all keys are essentially the same ([14], [18]): whatever key is selected for encryption, an 
attacker will in fact calculate the same ex-post probabilities of the plaintext. In data anonymization, 
this translates into the fact that different masking methods ultimately deliver the same kind of 
challenge for an attacker. Consider for example two arbitrary noise-based and rank-based methods, 
say additive noise addition and rank swapping. Because additive noise aims at altering the magnitude 
of the data, one could intuitively think that a distance-based record linkage attack would turn out to be 
more efficient than a rank-based attack, while the reverse would be true for data swapping. Yet, this is 
not the case. Because the functioning of any method can always be fundamentally described by an 
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alteration of ranks through a pure cipher, it is ultimately rank-based record linkage attacks that are 
relevant for both, and in fact, for any anonymization methods.  
Indeed, from a heterogeneous selection of methods it has been recently and experimentally 
characterized in the literature that rank-based record linkage attacks appear to seemingly and 
consistently outperform distance-based attacks ([19]). While no firm explanation was proposed as to 
why this is the case, we believe that Property 4 suggests a response. However, it must be noted that 
this proposition doesn’t convey any additional elements about how to define an adversary, notably 
which kind of background knowledge he must be empowered with to lead to a reasonable and realistic 
attack scenario, which is a long-standing issue in the literature ([2]). What Proposition 4 claims is just 
that whatever the background knowledge assumed, the cryptanalysis task is always the same and must 
be based on ranks.  
 
3.3  Remarks on the maximum-knowledge attacker model and the validity of the 
Kerckhoff’s principle in data anonymization 
The issue of an attacker’s background knowledge has been recently pushed further in the 
literature through the proposal of a maximum-knowledge attacker ([2]), which defines an attacker 
who knows both the original data set and its entire corresponding anonymized version. This is a rather 
extreme configuration, unlikely to be mirrored by concrete situations, but it remains however 
conceptually very insightful, as anonymization that can pass the test of such a situation will in fact be 
able to pass any test. Note also that this concept provides an additional justification to the irrelevance 
of small noise additions in data anonymization, as a maximum-knowledge attacker can eliminate the 
small noise matrix of Proposition 2 (being able to perform reverse mapping himself), which leaves 
him to uncover the permutation keys only ([2]). 
The concept of a maximum-knowledge attacker is the equivalent of a known-plaintext attack 
in cryptography. Other types of attack exist but carry less meaning in an individual data exchange. A 
cyphertext-only attack, where only the anonymized data set is available, is the opposite of a known-
plaintext attack, and while the latter may be seen as too stringent, the former is too naïve ([2]). As for 
chosen plaintext and cyphertext-attacks, they are relevant only in the case in which the attacker can 
interact with the cipher. Note that a maximum-knowledge attacker, observing both the original data 
set and its anonymized version, has nothing to gain in terms of information. One can view his attempt 
as purely slanderous, trying to discredit the data releaser by revealing his permutation keys. 
Now, given the assumption that such a powerful person might exist, this leads to one 
question: given his power, is the task faced by a maximum-knowledge attacker that difficult? In fact, 
the reply relies on an entity that has not been made explicit in the formulation of the cipher Γ: the 
record tracking numbers. Generally, data releasers can follow which anonymized record derives from 
which original record through a number that doesn’t carry any information of any sort and is 
unaffected by encryption. Moreover, when the data are released, all numbers can be modified or 
deleted. But these numbers, known for practical purposes by the data releaser but not by the 
maximum-knowledge attacker, act in fact as a mask for the permutation keys. To make this clear, 
table 3 illustrates the attacker’s perspective, using the toy example of section 2. 
 
 
 
As previously mentioned, it is clear that the attacker can reverse-map the data and eliminate 
the small noise addition. In this example, he has now to retrieve the permutation key (made of three 
permutation matrices). In fact, he is already observing some permutation matrices, but those are 
ID X1 X2 X3 ID Y1 Y2 Y3
1 13 135 3707 8 160 3248
2 20 52 826 20 57 822
3 2 123 -1317 -1 122 248
4 15 165 2419 18 135 597
5 29 160 -1008 29 164 -1927
Table 3. Point of view of a maximum-knowledge intruder
Original dataset X Masked dataset Y
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masked by his ignorance of the tracking numbers, which marks the limit of his knowledge. More 
explicitly, for each attribute he is observing the product 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑇𝐷𝑗𝐴𝑗: because he has no clue as to who is 
who between the original and the anonymized data, this is equivalent to assuming that, compared to 
the data releaser who obviously knows each and every term in the product 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑇𝐷𝑗𝐴𝑗, the attacker is 
facing an additional, unknown layer of permutation expressed by 𝐵. Therefore, he is only observing 
the resulting permutations patterns from the product but not its decomposition. More precisely, 
despite his knowledge of 𝐴𝑗 and its transpose, the matrix 𝐷𝑗 that he is trying to recompose is masked 
by 𝐵. As 𝐵 is also a permutation matrix, the attacker is observing an unknown permutation of the 
encryption keys. As a result, even with his postulated power, due to 𝐵 the attacker cannot avoid 
undertaking record linkage because it exists 𝑛! possible permutation keys by attributes, and only one 
will be the correct key. 
The fact that the knowledge of the permutation keys will be necessarily hidden when the 
cipher Γ is used makes the Kerckhoff’s principle fully relevant in data anonymization ([2]). This 
principle states that the encryption method must be made available to the public while only the key 
must be kept secret. In data anonymization, the relevant key ultimately happens to be permutation, no 
matter how anonymization is practiced. Thus, it can be made public that the cipher Γ has been used to 
protect the data, with the permutation keys remaining secret. Such claim won’t weaken the privacy 
guarantee offered by a data releaser but will contribute to greater clarity in individual data exchange, 
even in an environment made of maximum-knowledge intruders. 
 
To summarize this section, we formulated data anonymization as an all-purpose cipher that is 
able to replicate the core functioning of any anonymization method. The formulation in terms of a 
cipher allows deriving some properties which, while standard in cryptography, when applied in the 
context of data anonymization, deliver some general guiding principles that, to the best of the author's 
knowledge, have not been identified so far in the literature. Surely, additional principles could be 
derived. In particular, one could note that the cipher Γ is, theoretically speaking, a one-time pad 
([14]). A direct consequence of this is that in principle, perfect secrecy could be achieved in data 
anonymization ([12]). However, this possibility is a theoretical curiosum which has no empirical 
validity for at least two reasons which we believe illustrates well the fundamental differences between 
cryptography and data anonymization. The first is that, as mentioned, the notion of decipherment for 
individual data is not the same as in cryptography. While in the latter it took place when all the 
plaintext had been uncovered, in the former it is the amount of correct matches in a record-linkage 
attack that matters, i.e. which pieces of plaintext have been uncovered, and it doesn’t have to be all of 
them. So even in a one-time pad some correct matches could still be claimed. Thus, the notion of 
perfect secrecy has no real meaning in data anonymization, except if one makes the requirement that 
all records must be re-identified to qualify a data set as not secure. This is rather unrealistic. 
The second reason is that, for Γ to be strictly qualified as a one-time pad then the key 
selection should be truly random. While in cryptography this is fully acceptable, in data 
anonymization it is not. In addition to providing some privacy guarantees to individuals in the original 
data, the anonymized data should also meet data users’ needs by providing some information. As a 
result, some structures and constraints must be applied to the permutation keys for the released data to 
be meaningful. The fact that in data anonymization the keys selection must be guided with both 
protection and information in mind precludes randomly generating them. In fact, this raises the 
question of what should be the guidelines to calibrate the keys of the cipher in order to make it 
concretely usable. This will be discussed in the following section.  
 
4. Calibration of the cipher’s keys 
 
4.1 Power means in data anonymization 
We start by briefly summarizing a recent proposal that postulates power means as an 
overarching aggregative structure for the computation of universal measures of disclosure risk and 
information loss ([11]). First of all, it can be observed that for a given attribute j to be encrypted with 
the cipher and its associated key Dj, permutation distances can be retrieved by the computation of a 
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vector of absolute rank displacement rj, i.e. a vector measuring for each record the amount of rank 
shifting that a key contained
4
. Following what has been developed above, in order to build rj one can 
count line by line from the keys how many times the 1s have been moved by using the identity matrix 
as a benchmark. The evaluation of rj will lead to an assessment of disclosure risk based on absolute 
permutation distances. 
The evaluation of information loss follows the same approach but based on relative 
permutation distances. To see this, Proposition 2 characterized the only possible source of 
information loss in data anonymization. While marginal distributions can always be preserved, it is 
the alteration of the dependency among attributes that triggers information loss. In the cipher Γ, this 
can be captured by the relative properties of the permutation keys applied on two attributes j and j’. 
Consider for example that the same key is applied to both. Clearly, this is equivalent to permuting a 
block of attributes and the joint distribution of the block will be exactly preserved. Conversely, once 
the keys become different, one is necessarily modifying the relative records’ positions. This can be 
captured by a vector Δ(rk) of differences between the vectors rj and rj’, which is a vector of 
dissimilarity between the permutation keys that have been applied to the couple of attributes k=(j, j’) 
(with j≠ j’). When each of the components of Δ(rk) are equal to zero (or more precisely to an 
infinitesimally small value), this depicts the case of a permutation by block of two attributes. But 
when Δ(rk) has some non-zero elements, information has been modified. Note that this approach in 
terms of information is very general in its scope and relies on a very minimalist assumption: attributes 
taken pairwise are related by any monotic function.  
Therefore, disclosure risk and information loss can be evaluated through the use of two 
related quantities, the distributions of absolute and relative rank displacements. This leads to the 
following proposition, which establishes power means as a general class of measures for disclosure 
risk and information loss (see ([11]) for the original and complete proposal): 
 
Proposition 4: Denote by p=abs(p1,…,pn) a distribution of permutation distances, being relative or 
absolute. The following aggregative structure:  
𝐽(𝑝, 𝛼) =
{
  
 
  
 
(
1
𝑛
∑p𝑖
𝛼
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
1
𝛼
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 ≠ 0
∏𝑝𝑖
1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = 0
 
 
forms a class of disclosure risk measures when p is a distribution of absolute permutation distances 
and 𝛼 ≤ 1, and a class of information loss measures when p is a distribution of relative permutation 
distances and 𝛼 ≥ 1. 
 
 This proposal makes use of the fact that data anonymization methods all boil down to 
applying permutation patterns, which greatly simplifies evaluation. When using current methods, 
protection against disclosure risk and information loss occur at the intersection of two features: the 
appropriateness and the parametrization of the method selected, and the distributional properties of 
the data to be anonymized. For instance, if the data are skewed with a heavy tail on the right, then 
perturbation through additive noise won’t provide much protection, generally no matter the amount of 
noise added ([13]). Indeed, to protect the data sufficiently in that case, a more suitable method, like 
multiplicative noise, should be selected, and then its correct parametrization to reach the desired 
levels of protection and information will depend on how the data are effectively skewed. But, when 
data anonymization is viewed as permutation, then only the alteration of ranks matters. This is why 
the above proposal depicts a class of universal measures of disclosure risk and information loss, by 
making abstraction of the interplay between the distributional features of the data and the analytics of 
the methods. Indeed, the required inputs are only absolute and relative permutation distances. 
                                                 
4
 To avoid some unnecessary technical difficulties, zero values in rj will be assigned, without loss of generality, 
an infinitesimally small value ε>0. 
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  Using power means also allows capturing the variety of preferences that can occur in a data 
exchange, through the concepts of aversion to disclosure risk and information loss, something that is 
new in the literature. The arithmetic mean becomes a special case (α = 1) of 𝐽(p, α), which forms a 
natural dividing line by computing the average levels of absolute or relative permutation distances. 
From this benchmark, and using absolute permutation distances, the more α decreases, the more 
weight is given to the smallest permutation distances. In fact, the more α approaches -∞, the more 
𝐽(p, α) converges towards the smallest permutation distance in rj. As a result, for a given rj and 
𝛼′ <  α, we have 𝐽(p, α′)  ≤ 𝐽(p, α) : the lower is α, the stronger is the aversion to disclosure risk. 
Conversely, through the same reasoning and starting from the average level of relative permutation 
distances, the more α increases, the more weight is given to the highest relative permutation distances, 
and thus the higher the aversion to information loss. Notably, these two notions of aversion 
circumvent the issue involved in the empirical assessment of disclosure risk ([17]), where a score 
based on different measures of disclosure risk is computed using an ad-hoc weighting scheme. Under 
such an approach, weights can drive the overall assessment that is made. But using power means, 
measures can be computed on a continuum of weights which all carry an interpretation in terms of 
disclosure risk and information loss, thus providing a better grasp on the reality of micro data 
exchange, where various views about disclosure risk and information loss often meet. 
Now, it must be noted that while these measures have also been originally proposed for the 
ex-post evaluation of disclosure risk and information loss ([11]), i.e. after having performed reverse-
mapping for any method applied on any data set, in what precedes they have been purposely presented 
as ex-ante measures, i.e. by deriving absolute and relative permutation from the cipher’s keys. In fact, 
it is one of the proposals of this paper to use power means as a guidance to calibrate the cipher’s keys, 
as power means can be used equally effectively ex-ante or ex-post. However, before developing this 
notion, we provide a novel theoretical characterization of power means which, we believe, offers a 
powerful justification for their use.  
 
4.2 A theoretical characterization of power means 
Power means satisfies a set of basic properties and are already well-known outside the field of 
data anonymization ([20]). Here, and in the context of this paper, denoting a distribution of 
permutation distances by p=(p1,…,pn), being relative or absolute, J(p,α), the power mean of parameter 
α for the evaluation of p, satisfies the following: 
 
 Neutrality in evaluation (NE): if q is a permutation of p, then J(q,α)= J(p,α) 
This condition ensures that all the information used to evaluate p is considered equally. 
 
 Size independence (SI): if q=(p,p,…,p) is a m-duplicate of p (with m≥2), then J(q,α)= J(p,α) 
This condition connects the comparability of J(p,α) across data sets of different sizes, by establishing 
the ground for comparison on a per record basis. 
   
 Normalization (NO): if pi= pj=a for i,j=1,…,n, then J(p,α)=a 
Normalization ensures that if all the permutation values in p are equal, then J(p,α) is equal to this 
permutation value. 
 
 First degree homogeneity (FD): if q=λp for a scalar λ>0 J(q,α)= λ J(p,α) 
If the levels of permutation are magnified by the same scalar, so is the power mean. 
 
 Continuity (CO): J(p,α) is continuous 
A standard assumption, continuity makes sure that the power mean doesn’t change abruptly for small 
variations in p. 
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 Sub-domain coherency (SC): For p’ and p of the same size and q and q’ of the same size, if 
J(p’,α) > J(p,α) and J(q’,α) = J(q,α), then J((p’,q’),α) > J((p,q),α)  
Sub-domain coherency establishes that if the absolute or relative permutation distances from two 
sub-data sets change in a way that leads to an increase in the power mean in one and remains 
unaltered in the other, then the overall power mean must increase. Stated otherwise, if absolute 
permutation distances increase in one sub-set but remain unchanged in the rest of the data set, then 
protection against disclosure risk must increase on the overall data set. Along the same lines, if 
relative permutation distances increase in one sub-set but remain unchanged in the rest of the data set, 
then information loss must increase in the overall data set. 
 
The fact that the class of power means satisfies (NE), (SI), (NO), (FD), (CO), (SC) is trivial. 
However, less trivial is the fact that this is the only class of measures to do so: 
 
Theorem: An aggregative structure for the evaluation of disclosure risk and information loss satisfies 
(NE), (SI), (NO), (FD), (CO) and (SC) if and only if it is a power mean. 
 
Proof: For necessity, we left the proof to the reader. For sufficiency, we start by assuming a function 
J(.) that satisfies (NE), (SI), (NO), (FD), (CO) and (SC). In what follows, permutation distances can 
be defined in relative or absolute terms indifferently.  
Consider the universe of all possible data sets of at least 3 records, i.e. n≥3, and pick in this universe 
four of them which, after anonymization, generate four distributions of permutation distances: p and q 
of size m<n, and p’ and q‘ of size m’=n-m. Then, assume that J(p,p’) ≥ J(q,p’). (SC) precludes having 
J(p) < J(q), which thus implies J(p) ≥ J(q). If this inequality holds strictly, then by (SC) we have 
J(p,q’) ≥ J(q,q’). But if inequality is not strict, then by (SC) J(p,q’) < J(q,q’) doesn’t hold because 
J(p,q,q’) < J(q,q’,p) would contradict (NE). As a result, we have J(p,p’) ≥ J(q, p’) ⇒ J(p,q’) ≥ J(q, 
q’). That means, bearing in mind that J(.) is assumed to verify (CO), that J(.) is strictly separable in 
every data set partition, which implies, following ([21]), that J(p) can be expressed as: 
𝐽(𝑝) = 𝛧𝑛 (∑𝛺𝑛(𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
for every p of size n and with 𝛺𝑛(. ) continuous and 𝛧𝑛(. ) continuous and strictly increasing. 
 
So far, what have been demonstrated is that (SC), (NE) and (CO) leads inevitably to a separable 
function. Now, what follows works along the same line as [22], which uses separabality to 
characterize power means.  
By (NO) we have 𝑎 = 𝛧𝑛(∑ 𝛺𝑛(𝑎)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) for a>0, which leads to 𝛧𝑛
−1(𝑎) = 𝑛𝛺𝑛(𝑎). Assuming 
𝛨𝑛 = 𝛧𝑛
−1(𝑎) with 𝛨𝑛(. ) continuous and strictly increasing, 𝐽(𝑝) can be rewritten as: 
𝐽(𝑝) = 𝛨𝑛
−1 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝛨𝑛(𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) for every p of size n≥3 
 From this last equation assume 𝛨 = 𝛨4 and m=4n. We can write: 
𝛨(𝐽(𝑝)) = 𝐻 [𝛨𝑚
−1 (
1
𝑚
∑𝛨𝑚(𝛨
−1(𝛨(𝑝𝑖))
𝑚
𝑖=1
)] 
= 𝛩𝑚
−1 (
1
𝑚
∑ 𝛩𝑚(𝛨(𝑝𝑖))
𝑚
𝑖=1 ) with 𝛩𝑚(. ) = 𝛨𝑚(𝛨
−1(. )) strictly increasing and continuous  
Once again, we have 𝛩𝑚(𝑎) = 𝑎 and in particular 𝛩4(𝑎). From here set p with n=2, p’ its 2-
duplicate and p’’ its m-duplicate. (SI) implies (with in what follows 𝑤𝑖 = 𝛨(𝑝𝑖)): 
𝛨(𝐽(𝑝′′)) = 𝛩𝑚
−1 (
1
𝑚
∑𝛩𝑚(𝛨(𝑝𝑖
′′))
𝑚
𝑖=1
) 
= 𝛩𝑚
−1(0.5 ∗ 𝛩𝑚(𝑤1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛩𝑚(𝑤2)) = 𝛨(𝐽(𝑝
′)) 
= 𝛩4
−1(0.5 ∗ 𝛩4(𝑤1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛩4(𝑤2)) = 0.5 ∗ (𝑤1 + 𝑤2) 
Thus, 𝛩𝑚(. ) must satisfy: 
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0.5 ∗ 𝛩𝑚(𝑤1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛩𝑚(𝑤2) = 𝛩𝑚(0.5 ∗ (𝑤1 +𝑤2)) 
This last equation is a Jensen’s functional equation having the following solution ([23]): 
𝛩𝑚(𝑏) = 𝑎𝑚 ∗ 𝑏 + 𝑐𝑚 for some scalars 𝑎𝑚 and 𝑐𝑚. 
This solution implies for m=4n: 
𝛨(𝐽(𝑝)) =
1
𝑚
∑𝐻(𝑝𝑖)
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
Now, for a given data set with n≥1 and its four-duplicate, with p and p’ the respective distribution of 
permutation distances, it holds by (SI) that 
𝛨(𝐽(𝑝)) = 𝛨(𝐽(𝑝′)) =
1
𝑛
∑𝐻(𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
=
1
4𝑛
∑𝐻(𝑝𝑖
′)
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
In turn, this implies that:  
𝐽(𝑝) = 𝛨−1 [
1
𝑛
∑𝐻(𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
] 
Now, consider a data set with two observations and a scalar 𝜗 > 0. By (FD) and the equation above 
it holds that (with in what follows 𝑤𝑖 = 𝛨(𝑝𝑖), meaning that 𝛨
−1(𝑤𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖): 
𝛨[𝜗𝛨−1(0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝑝1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝑝2))] = 0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝜗𝑝1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝜗𝑝2) 
⟹𝛨[𝜗𝛨−1(0.5 ∗ 𝑤1 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑤2)] = 0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝜗𝛨
−1(𝑤1)) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛨(𝛨
−1(𝑤2)) 
⟹𝛨𝜗[𝛨−1(0.5 ∗ 𝑤1 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑤2)] = 0.5 ∗ 𝛨
𝜗(𝜗𝛨−1(𝑤1)) + 0.5 ∗ 𝛨
𝜗(𝛨−1(𝑤2)) 
with 𝛨𝜗(𝑎) = 𝛨(𝜗𝑎) for a>0 
Now, assuming 𝐿𝜗(𝑎) = 𝛨𝜗(𝛨−1(𝑎)) we have: 
𝐿𝜗(0.5 ∗ 𝑤1 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑤2) = 0.5 ∗ 𝐿
𝜗(𝑤1) + 0.5 ∗ 𝐿
𝜗(𝑤2) 
Following ([23]) the solution to this Jensen’s functional equation is: 
𝐿𝜗(𝑏) = 𝑥𝜗 ∗ 𝑏 + 𝑦𝜗 for some scalars 𝑥𝜗 and 𝑦𝜗. 
Now, using H(b)=a it holds that: 
𝐻(𝜗𝑏) = 𝑥(𝜗)𝛨(𝑏) + 𝑦(𝜗) 
Following ([24]) the solution to this functional equation is: 
𝐻(𝑏) = {
𝑔 ∗ 𝑏𝛼 + ℎ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = 0
𝑔 ∗ 𝑙𝑛 𝑏 + ℎ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 ≠ 0
 
But given that 𝐽(𝑝) = 𝛨−1 [
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐻(𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ] we thus have: 
𝐽(𝑝, 𝛼) =
{
  
 
  
 
(
1
𝑛
∑𝑝𝑖
𝛼
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
1
𝛼
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 ≠ 0
∏𝑝𝑖
1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼 = 0
 
 Thus, 𝐽(𝑝, 𝛼) is a power mean, which completes the proof. 
 
This result establishes power means as the only aggregative structure which, alongside a set 
of standard properties, satisfies sub-domain coherency. It is a result valid beyond the context of data 
anonymization, in fact for any vector of any quantities to be evaluated. It must also be emphasized 
that power means have been previously theoretically characterized in the literature ([22]), but by 
postulating at the onset the condition of separability. The result in this paper extends this previous 
work by demonstrating that separability appears to be in fact based on three conditions: neutrality in 
evaluation, continuity and sub-domain coherency. It is this last one that is of particular and practical 
importance for data anonymization, as it turns out that only power means can coherently cope with 
anonymization by block of records. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
4.3 Ex-ante calibration of permutation and a new approach to data anonymization 
As stated earlier, data anonymization is currently practiced using a variety of methods, often 
very heterogeneous in nature and with some of them now very well-established in the literature. 
However, regardless of the many choices available, at a general level they are all used the same way 
(Figure 1). A method is selected with the anonymization practitioner having in mind either a utility-
first or a privacy-first approach, and is applied to a data set. The outcome of this is then evaluated 
using specific measures of disclosure risk and information loss. But as mentioned earlier, because the 
methods’ parameters in themselves are a poor guide to inform about the final levels of privacy and 
information obtained, as for a given parametrization different outcomes are possible according to the 
distributional features of the data, a necessary and specific ex-post checking step leads generally to 
some re-runs before reaching an anonymized version of the data viewed as acceptable. Additionally, 
because the ex-post checking is specific, the comparison of performances across different methods is 
an arduous task ([9]). 
 
 
 
We saw already that the use of power means on absolute and relative permutation distances 
provides a ground for universal ex-post checking, based on the retrieval of the permutations pattern 
that a method has generated. But at the conceptual level, the fact of using a method that unavoidably 
leads to a permutations pattern (plus eventually but unnecessarily a small noise addition), or applying 
this permutation pattern directly by using the cipher previously developed, is equivalent. These two 
ways will lead strictly to the same outcome in terms of risk and information. However, the latter 
appears to be more efficient, as once the permutations pattern has been set, it will be automatically 
translated into the final, anonymized data set. In fact, this will avoid the empirical ex-post checking 
stage and some eventual iteration to attain the desired levels of disclosure risk and information loss. 
This leads to a new approach for the practice of individual data anonymization (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Of course, for this new approach to be practical, it requires thinking about anonymization 
only in terms of permutation. The permutation paradigm already pointed out that any anonymization 
INPUT: Selected 
masking method
INPUT: Original data set
OUTPUT: Anonymised data set
Potential re-
anonymization 
steps
EX-POST EVALUATION: specific disclosure risk 
and information loss measures
Figure 1. Current approach to data anonymization
OUTPUT: Anonymised data set
Figure 2. New approach to data anonymization
EX-ANTE PERMUTATION REQUIREMENTS
INPUT: Encryption keys
CIPHER INPUT: orginal dataset
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method is equivalent to applying permutations. This is in a way a new language for data 
anonymization. With classical methods it is primarily their parameters (for example the variance for 
noise addition), and their varying strengths the language, which allow translating some targeted levels 
of disclosure risk or information loss into practice, albeit due to the varying nature of the data this 
translation is rarely perfect at the end. Now to set permutation as a language to perform 
anonymization ex-ante, it is needed to expand its vocabulary so as to provide guidance on how to 
build the cipher’s keys. 
As we saw in Section 2, generally a data exchange requires two groups of agents: a data 
provider and the data users. The former wants to disseminate some individual data for some users that 
are in need of them. But prior to the exchange the provider, equipped with some raw, non-anonymized 
data, needs to secure them so that no individuals could be reasonably identified, while at the same 
time providing an acceptable level of information. To achieve this he will undertake data 
anonymization himself. Now, let’s introduce a new third agent, the permutation provider, whose task 
is to build some suitable permutation keys. Clearly, this new agent will never need to see the data. He 
can just work in isolation on the keys, having as information the number of attributes and individuals 
in the data, signaled by the releaser. However, what the releaser has to do is formulate some 
desiderata on how he wants the data to be anonymized. This can be expressed through a permutation 
menu. 
First, and for disclosure risk, the data releaser must advise the amount of permutation for each 
attribute. For example, for a given attribute, he can advise that he wants all records at least permuted 
one time, while at the same time a certain average of permutations must be achieved. For other 
attributes, these constraints can be modified, for example not all individuals must be permuted, or the 
average amount of permutation can be lower or reinforced, for example every individual must be 
permuted at least two times and the average amount of absolute permutation must be high. Second, 
and for information loss, the releaser must notify which couple of attributes are critical in terms of 
information and must be preserved to a large extent, with a small average of relative permutation 
distance. The other less valuable couples in terms of information can then be relatively permuted 
higher on average or within a certain portion of the distribution of relative permutation distances. 
Obviously, all the requirements in a permutation menu must be formulated simultaneously, as the 
keys taken in isolation make up for disclosure risk, while it is their relative properties taken by pair 
that make up for information loss. The data releaser must then formulate all his demands 
simultaneously to the permutation provider and must pay attention to the coherency of his requests, 
bearing in mind for example that two attributes cannot be protected with very dissimilar keys if at the 
same time their joint distribution has to be reasonably preserved. Keeping up with such coherency 
simply means coping with the unavoidable protection/information trade-off in data anonymization. 
Now, power means constitute a way to create a permutation menu. For different scenarios of 
risk and information aversion, different levels of power means can be required ex-ante, from which 
the permutation provider will reconstitute the permutation keys. Of course, technically speaking it is 
clear that there may be no unique way to create permutation matrices from various values of power 
means. This won’t affect the overall level of protection and information for the anonymized data set, 
while of course it could change the property of verifiability by the subjects ([2]): for a given set of 
power means values and the associated levels of protection of information, different keys could lead 
to a given individual being permuted differently. This is, however, a minor issue. There may be also 
no permutation keys that can be derived from a set of power means, but this problem can be avoided 
first by ensuring the coherency of the permutation menu proposed. 
While power means is one way of creating a permutation menu for then generating keys, it 
must be recognized that there may be other ways. However, we just saw that power means are the 
only measures that are sub-domain coherent, which is a powerful justification for using them. 
Notably, and as far as big data are concerned, it can offer some obvious practical benefits. For 
instance, anonymization can be performed by blocks to ease the computational workload: when the 
data are split in m blocks, with some given levels of protection and information on m-1 blocks, then 
the anonymization of the m
th
 block will lead to an increase in protection of the overall data set. Such 
coherency won’t be ensured by other measures. 
 
 
19 
 
4.4 Examples of permutation menus 
We now provide some empirical examples of permutation menus. To make the bridge with 
existing methods, we will first show the menus uncovered by some of them. We will then turn to 
menus conceived independently of any method, i.e. based on power means guidance only. 
Our first examples retrieve the permutation menus of one rank-based method, i.e. rank 
swapping, and two noise-based methods, i.e. additive and multiplicative noise injection. The 
experimental data set used is two attributes of the Census data set observed over 1080 records. This 
data set has been used several times in the literature to evaluate the properties of anonymization 
techniques in terms of disclosure risk and information loss ([25]). Additive noises are injected with a 
standard deviation equal to 50% of the standard deviations of the two attributes, multiplicative noises 
are drawn from a uniform distribution within the range (0.75,1.25) and rank swapping is set with a 
swapping distance of 30%. Masked data are then reverse-mapped to compute the levels of absolute 
and relative permutations. From these levels, we then compute the universal measures of disclosure 
risk and information outlined above for a quasi-continuum of aversion parameters, i.e. by increments 
of 0.01. As suggested in ([11]), the results are finally displayed directly under the form of curves with 
the aversion parameters on the x-axis and the measures of disclosure risk for each attributes and the 
measures of information loss for the couple of attributes on the y-axis. These graphical representations 
display the permutation menus for all ranges of aversion to disclosure risk (Figures 3 and 4) and 
information loss (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Absolute permutation patterns for the first attribute
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Figure 4. Absolute permutation patterns for the second attribute
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 For the two attributes, the three permutation menus proposed differ across the methods 
considered. Data swapping is equivalent to formulating the following requirements
5
:  
 
 All records must be permuted at least one time (as the associated curves in Figure 1 and 2 
never reach zero). 
 A large portion of the records must be permuted at least 20 times (as the associated curves in 
Figure 1 and 2 are above 20 from an aversion around -1.7 and above). 
 On average each record must be permuted 160 times (which is the value reached by the 
curves when α=1, i.e. the average levels of absolute permutation distances). 
However, noise-based methods deliver the following menus: 
 
 Not all records have to permuted and in fact a large portion of them can remain untouched for 
the two attributes (as the associated curves in Figure 1 and 2 quickly hit zero). 
 On average each record must be permuted 80 or 140 times. 
Regarding information loss (Figure 5), the permutation menus can be described as follow: 
 
 On average the relative permutation distances can be relatively high (around 120 for noise 
addition and swapping) or low (60 for multiplicative noise). 
 Potentially, a large portion of records can be relatively permuted high (for noise addition the 
maximum relative permutation distance is established at almost 400). 
 As a result, additive noise proposes some permutation requirements for which the constraint 
of preserving information between the two attributes (and thus the similarity between the 
permutation keys of each attributes) is looser than the requirements expressed by the 
swapping and multiplicative noise methods. 
 Now, instead of starting from already existing methods, one can start from some permutation 
menus and the associated curves and then generate the permutation keys that will fulfill these 
requirements. Let’s assume the following: 
 
                                                 
5
 Here the menus expressed are using permutation distances as the unit. By normalizing with the maximum 
permutation distances possible in the data set (and thus re-scaling Figure 3, 4 and 5), they can also be 
expressed in percentages, with the power means values ranging between 0 and 1 ([11]).  
Figure 5. Relative permutation patterns for the two attributes
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 For the first attribute, we require that all records must be permuted at least one time and that 
the average level of absolute permutation must be high (menu 1). Alternatively, we require a 
low level of average absolute permutation in conjunction with a large chunk of records not 
being permuted (menu 2). 
 For the second attribute, we require quite similar menus with a large chunk of records not 
permuted at all, albeit we also set menu 1 to have an average level of absolute permutation 
almost twice as high than menu 2. 
 As a result, we aim at two different scenarios for information loss. With menu 1 the keys for 
the two attributes are relatively dissimilar in their profiles, not least because the first key must 
permute all records while the other not. However, with menu 2 the keys are relatively similar. 
Consequently, we relax on purpose the constraint of information preservation for menu 1 
while menu 2 must preserve it to a large extent. 
Figure 6, 7 and 8 display the resulting permutation requirements when one starts from power means 
desiderata, creates the associated vectors of absolute and relative rank displacements and then 
generates the underlying permutation matrices. Notably, one can see that in the second menu relative 
permutation distances are small for whatever scenario of aversion to information loss, while this is the 
contrary for the first menu (Figure 8). This result is ensured by the similar absolute permutation 
profiles for the two attributes requested in menu 2 (Figures 6 and 7). Now, when thinking about data 
anonymization only in terms of permutation as a universal approach, as we just did, the data can then 
be anonymized using the created keys and the cipher of Proposition 3. The ex-post properties in terms 
of disclosure risk and information loss will be strictly the same as the ones determined ex-ante. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Permutation menus for the first attribute
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5. Conclusions and future research 
In ([2]) a new anonymization paradigm, which views any methods as functionally equivalent 
to permutation, was presented for the evaluation of any anonymization methods applied on any data 
set, while in ([11]) a set of universal metrics for disclosure risk and information loss were developed 
based on this paradigm. These developments were not seeking for a new anonymization framework 
per se, but instead tried to establish an analytical environment for the comparison of currently existing 
methods in a sound and universal way. In this paper, we have challenged this limitation of scope by 
arguing that these results can be as effective pre-anonymization as they are post-anonymization. 
Borrowing from cryptography, we have developed for the first time a general cipher for data 
anonymization. This cipher is able to replicate the outcome of any method, and some of its properties 
outline general lessons for data anonymization. In particular, at a general level of functioning, 
anonymization can always be performed independently of the data to be anonymized. As a result, 
beyond being a universal mimicker, the cipher is a tool in itself that can be used through the 
exploration of permutation structures. We then provided some guidance about how to explore these 
structures, notably by proposing to calibrate permutation keys using power means, for which we also 
suggested a new theoretical justification. The tools proposed in this paper allow for a more efficient, 
ex-ante approach to data anonymization. 
We leave as future work the deeper exploration of these proposals. First of all, the generation 
of permutation through the reverse engineering of power means should be enhanced and established 
further. Second, as it appears that data anonymization relies on the single principle of permutation, 
which could be phrased as a general principle as “to be protected, become someone else”, an intuitive 
privacy guarantee and thus a new privacy model should be developed around such a principle. Third, 
Figure 7. Permutation menus for the second attribute
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Figure 8. Permutation menus for the joint distribution
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the exploration of the composition of an approach by permutation is warranted, i.e. when merging two 
data sets with certain permutation patterns, identifying the result of the merge with its subsequent 
privacy and information guarantees.  
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